Tag Archives: Stan Glisson

Glisson: Supreme court’s ruling paves way for monitoring plea bargaining

(Blogger’s note: Back to help us untangle our often complex legal system is Stan Glisson, a local Bremerton defense attorney. You might remember his last column explaining whether a driver flashing his headlights is a first amendment right. Here’s Glisson’s take on two supreme court decisions this week that will give criminal defendants far greater abilities to challenge decisions in the prcoess known as ‘plea bargaining.’)

In two brand new decisions, the US Supreme Court has dramatically extended legal protection to criminal defendants in the plea negotiation process. Historically, courts have protected defendants against incompetent defense with the ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ standard. Basically, the accused person can be granted a new trial when the lawyer’s level of skill at trial appears so poor, or a strategic decision so difficult to justify, that that the jury did not hear a reasonable defense.

Now, the Supreme Court has extended this protection to apparently incompetent representation even on cases that don’t go to trial. In Missouri v. Frye, the defendant was offered a misdemeanor plea and 90 days in jail for what could have been a felony driving offense. The lawyer did not tell the client the plea offer, and it was eventually withdrawn. Later, the accused plead guilty to the felony and received a sentence of three years in prison. The high court decided that failure to advise the client of the favorable plea offer was ineffective assistance, and has now vacated the three year sentence.

For the Court, this is a huge departure and a bold change in the law. The decision requires of the states an enormous undertaking; find a practical way to monitor plea negotiations, previously regarded as semi-confidential, for effective advocacy. The Court recognizes that nationwide about 95% of criminal cases are negotiated short of trial. The decision explains that to a large extent “[plea negotiation] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” As such, the criminal defendant is absolutely entitled to have competent, diligent counsel at the negotiation stage, just like they are at the trial stage. Defense counsel has a duty to communicate potentially favorable plea offers to the defendant, and the court now will have some obligation to monitor that interaction.

Interesting that the Supreme Court made note of one common, and deeply disturbing, phenomenon that occurs with plea negotiation. “[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes. This often results in individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter sentences than other individuals who are less morally culpable but take a chance and go to trial.” The Court does not suggest, as personally troubling as this is, that the court should be involved in changing that outcome. The key issue is whether the defendant was aware of his or her plea options, and made a knowing and informed decision to go forward to trial, understanding the risks that follow. The reality that a less culpable defendant often receives the far harsher sentence is a symptom of the plea negotiation process and prosecutorial discretion, and will be upheld absent ineffective representation.

In Washington, this idea is not new. In a 2005 case, a local lawyer was suspended from practicing law after it was documented that he failed to communicate a written 57 month plea offer to a defendant. The case went to trial, the defendant was convicted, and faced at least 221 months in prison. When the facts about the plea negotiation process were revealed, the Superior Court withdrew the convictions and the defendant was ultimately allowed to accept the original 57 month offer.

So our courts have been willing to listen to the occasional extreme case of ineffective plea negotiation representation. But the US Supreme Court now appears to be requiring that courts be prepared to examine that process in every criminal case. The inquiry, the Court explains, becomes how to define the duty and responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargain process. This is inherently difficult, as “The art of negotia­tion is at least as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy and it presents questions farther removed from immediate judicial supervision.”

So how are the courts going to administer this extra responsibility to ensure competence in negotiations? The Supreme Court suggests plea negotiations in writing, perhaps filed in court to show the history of the negotiation process. This is a major practical challenge, but would protect prosecutors and courts from frivolous motions based on unfavorable post-trial sentencings. For example in 2010 nearly 10,000 misdemeanor cases were filed in Kitsap County courts. In one local court, two public defenders last year were assigned nearly 900 criminal cases to handle. Despite growing obligations and legal expectations placed on public defense attorneys, funding for those positions is routinely insufficient. Frankly, it is not a popular place for elected officials to suggest taxpayer money be spent, when prosecution and law enforcement also need funding. In some respects, the court systems, prosecutor’s offices, and public defenders are already working at maximum capacity. But somehow, we will have to find a way for courts to observe not only that defendants’ rights are protected in court and at trial, but also in their lawyer’s offices, on the phone or email, when plea discussions are going on.

The added protection for defendants is undoubtedly the right thing to do, and now it is the law. The accused person must have a competent lawyer who communicates with them throughout the process. A person accused of a crime is entitled to that at a bare minimum. How we are going to monitor that will be the question our courts wrestle with in the years to come.

Stan Glisson is an attorney in Bremerton with the firm Glisson, Witt and Altman. Their firm mainly handles DUI and misdemeanor defense, as well as felony defense and civil cases. Glisson earned his law degree at the University of Washington, has worked as a Kitsap County deputy prosecutor, and as a Kitsap and Snohomish defense attorney before entering private practice.

Flashing your headlights: a first amendment right? (Part 1)

Blogger’s Note: When a Florida man flashed his headlights to warn oncoming motorists of an upcoming speed trap, he was pulled over and ticketed. He’s taken the fight to court, where he’s filed a class-action lawsuit alleging his free speech rights were violated.

I’ve sought the perspective of two locals — Bremerton defense attorney Stan Glisson and Port Orchard top cop Al Townsend — to give us their take on this unusual but intriguing case. Glisson’s essay will run today while Townsend’s commentary will appear here Saturday. Be sure to read up on the case first

A car passes a hazard on a roadway; maybe a downed tree, maybe an animal in the road, maybe a police speed trap. The driver flashes their headlights as they approach oncoming traffic, to warn them of the peril ahead. The practice has existed as long as I have been driving, usually to warn of a parked police officer running their radar.

It is no surprise that some police officers disapprove of the practice. But in Florida, that disapproval commonly went one step further to ticketing the drivers for flashing their headlights. Police alleged basically that the headlight flashing is a distraction to others, but the perception is that the citations were issued as retribution for disrupting their speed trap.

One Florida man who saw a speed trap and flashed his lights as a warning at other drivers got such a ticket. He is now suing the state, arguing that flashing headlights is a form of communication, a type of ‘speech’ protected by our first amendment. Interestingly, since the lawsuit, Florida police have been instructed to discontinue the practice of issuing such tickets.

Protected speech takes as many forms as we have imagination. It’s one thing to tell a friend you saw a speed trap. It’s another to yell ‘fire’ in a crowded theater. But free speech contains almost everything in between.

The idea of free speech is not always easy to swallow. It is completely fair to think that speeders should get caught and cited, and anyone trying to warn them is obstructing good police work. But if we believe in free speech in this country, it means protecting all speech. The most important speech to protect is the unpopular; it needs protection the most. We are free to talk to each other about what the government is doing, whether war strategy, economic policy, or police activity. The right to speak out against the government was arguably the most important right to our founding fathers, hence its prominent position in the Bill of Rights. The freedom we enjoy to speak our minds has to extend to warnings about speed traps, to literature, to profanity, and yes, on occasion to pasties on baristas.

Where the Florida law suit will end up is anyone’s guess. It speaks volumes that the police have stopped issuing these tickets. If you see a speed trap and want to warn other drivers, flash those lights. If you don’t want to, that’s fine too. We have to respect your decision about what you choose to say or not to say and every idea, popular or not, must be allowed to be heard. As Atticus Finch said, the one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s conscience. So do as your conscience tells you. As for me, I’ll keep flashing my lights.

Stan Glisson is an attorney in Bremerton with the firm Glisson, Witt and Altman. Their firm mainly handles DUI and misdemeanor defense, as well as felony defense and civil cases. Glisson earned his law degree at the University of Washington, has worked as a Kitsap County deputy prosecutor, and as a Kitsap and Snohomish defense attorney before entering private practice.

Law in Focus: Bikini Baristas and Free Speech

(Blogger’s note: Stan Glisson, a local Bremerton defense attorney, is back to help us sort through the legal issues of the so-called “bikini baristas.” Here’s his take. You can read his earlier posts here.

The first amendment to the US constitution prohibits the government from “abridging the freedom of speech”, among other things. It is said that many delegates to the Constitutional Convention refused to sign the Constitution without a bill of rights, they considered these rights so important. Freedom of speech has been interpreted over the last two centuries to include a variety of forms of expression, primarily to ensure to Americans that our government can never censor critical examination. Questioning the government is undoubtedly protected. Also literature, for example, of essentially any type is safe; film is protected, as is protesting, organization of labor, and now … pasties?

Around the state, scantily dressed baristas have been in the news. Young women working the stands have been alleged to wear shorts, bikinis, bras, sometimes just pasties. Arrested in Snohomish county, charged in Pierce county with public exposure, the coffee stands are drawing more and more attention, while increasing in number. They are clearly popular, but troublesome to some. So should the county take action? Should they be outlawed; can the employees charged and arrested?

Luckily, our local authorities are devoting their time to more pressing matters. Also, the law allowing prosecution of the semi – clothed baristas doesn’t appear to exist here. State law only prohibits exposure of the body if likely to cause “affront or alarm”. Hard to imagine, in a scenario where the women really are only seen by those who seek them out. In Pierce, the county code pretty clearly outlaws pasties in any public place. The Bremerton code, incidentally, contains a nearly identical provision. The Kitsap County code, however, doesn’t appear to contain any such prohibition. So in the unincorporated county, it certainly seems that none of these stands are breaking the law by dressing employees in swimsuits, undergarments, or pasties.

The local government could draft a law to prohibit such shops if it so desired. But should it? Would the Constitution allow it? The First Amendment has certainly been invoked to protect more offensive forms of expression than minimal clothing. Crude t-shirts, bumper stickers, random vulgarities that we hope our kids don’t notice – these are offenses we routinely endure, but are protected. We have become desensitized to the ubiquitous comic strip character urinating on disfavored car company logos (And if you have stick figures representing your family members in your back window, well … I guess you have rights too). Pornography, flag desecration, even racism and hate speech; these have all been specifically protected by the highest courts in the country. We each have the right to express ourselves in almost any creative way, regardless of offensiveness to others. In fact, it’s generally only offensive expression that requires protection.

The French author Voltaire is quoted as saying, “I may disagree with what you say; but I will defend with my life your right to say it.” We express ourselves in words, action, association with others, and yes – our clothing. By what we wear, we create an image and express an attitude. The government can’t outlaw particular styles of dress any more than it can regulate the music you listen to or the color of the tie you wear to work. If a shop owner wants to create a certain climate or entice a certain clientele by having employees dressed in skimpy clothing, it seems to me that we as a society have to allow it. If we lived in a warmer climate, such attire might not be so rare. But if we deny the right to baristas to wear bikinis to work, what right are you willing to give up next?

Stan Glisson is an attorney in Bremerton with the firm Glisson and Witt. Their firm mainly handles DUI and misdemeanor defense, as well as felony defense. Glisson earned his law degree at the University of Washington, has worked as a Kitsap County deputy prosecutor, and as a Kitsap and Snohomish defense attorney before entering private practice.